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Marketing managers increasingly recognize the need to measure and communicate the impact of their actions on
shareholder returns. This study focuses on the shareholder value effects of pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer
advertising (DTCA) and direct-to-physician (DTP) marketing efforts. Although DTCA has moderate effects on brand
sales and market share, companies invest vast amounts of money in it. Relying on Kalman filtering, the authors
develop a methodology to assess the effects from DTCA and DTP on three components of shareholder value: stock
return, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. Investors value DTCA positively because it leads to higher stock
returns and lower systematic risk. Furthermore, DTCA increases idiosyncratic risk, which does not affect investors
who maintain well-diversified portfolios. In contrast, DTP marketing has modest positive effects on stock returns
and idiosyncratic risk. The outcomes indicate that evaluations of marketing expenditures should include a
consideration of the effects of marketing on multiple stakeholders, not just the sales effects on consumers.
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S
tock prices reflect the expected future value of firms.
This value also depends on marketing expenditures,
both through intermediate metrics and in the form of
a direct effect on investors (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009).
Such effects are evident in the levels of (first moment) and
fluctuations in (second moment) stock prices. Thus, in prin-
ciple, marketing expenditures such as advertising may have
limited sales response effects but significant investor
response effects, or vice versa.
Recent research has demonstrated that a firm’s advertis-
ing affects stock returns, beyond the effect of advertising on
revenues and profits (e.g., Joshi and Hanssens 2010). Simi-
larly, communicating the added value created by product
innovation yields greater firm value effects (e.g., Srinivasan
et al. 2009). As McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007)
report, a firm’s advertising also lowers its systematic market
risk. Consequently, to evaluate marketing expenditures
properly and improve marketing resource allocations, mod-
els that consider the effects of marketing expenditures on
multiple stakeholders, such as customers and investors, are
necessary (e.g., Luo 2007).
In this study, we examine the influence of advertising
expenditures on investors and thus (1) the levels of stock
returns and the risk associated with these returns, distin-
guishing (2) systematic (market risk factor) and (3) idiosyn-
cratic (firm-specific) risks. Our framework also moves
beyond the theories and variables used in previous studies
to determine whether firms should invest in marketing
actions with limited sales response. In doing so, this study
offers new contributions over previous research (e.g., Joshi
and Hanssens 2010; McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007).
In particular, we simultaneously estimate the effects of mar-
keting on all three components of shareholder value using
Kalman filtering. Building on the four-factor model that
Carhart (1997) proposes, we develop a dynamic model to
relate pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA)
and direct-to-physician (DTP) marketing expenditures to
stock returns and volatilities while controlling for financial
performance.
Pharmaceutical DTCA is a relatively new, and heavily
debated, phenomenon: The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) relaxed regulations on DTCA only in 1997. Recent
research suggests limited short- and long-term effects of
DTCA on sales, which places pharmaceutical marketers,
similar to their counterparts in other industries, under con-
stant pressure to justify their sales and marketing budgets.
We investigate why many pharmaceutical firms continue to
spend on DTCA despite the limited sales effects. Prior
research in this field has largely focused on marketing per-
formance outcomes, such as sales, share, and compliance
(Kremer et al. 2008; Manchanda et al. 2005; Wosinska
2005), which cannot explicitly quantify the financial out-
comes of pharmaceutical DTCA. We are not aware of any
study that systematically quantifies the impact of DTCA on
stock returns and volatilities. To fill this gap, we aim to cap-
ture the impact of DTCA on returns and volatilities and
compare the effects of DTCA with those of other marketing
expenditures, such as those directed toward physicians.
The outcomes of our study reveal that investors’
response to DTCA is positive. On average, over time, and
across firms, we find that DTCA leads to higher stock
returns and lower systematic risk. The effect of DTCA on
idiosyncratic risk is positive. In contrast, DTP marketing
has only modest positive effects on stock returns and idio-
syncratic risk. This has important consequences for the allo-
cation of marketing expenditures over DTCA and DTP.
In the next section, we provide some background on
DTCA in the pharmaceutical industry, followed by a con-
ceptual framework of the relationship between marketing
expenditures and shareholder value. After we describe our
research methodology, we provide a description of the mar-
keting and financial data used, and then we outline the
empirical results. Finally, we offer managerial implications,
formulate conclusions, and discuss their implications for
marketing academics and practitioners.
Background on Pharmaceutical
DTCA
Before 1980, pharmaceutical DTCA was nearly non-
existent. Beginning in the 1980s and early 1990s, a limited
amount of DTCA began appearing. Expenditures on DTCA
increased dramatically after the FDA relaxed its regulation
of ethical drug advertising on television in August 1997. For
the first time, the FDA permitted product-specific DTCA
that could mention both the drug’s name and the condition
for which it was to be used, without disclosing a summary
of contraindications, side effects, or effectiveness (a “brief
summary”) (Rosenthal et al. 2002). Since then, DTCA
expenditures have increased faster than expenditures on
other marketing instruments in the pharmaceutical industry
(IMS Health 2009).
Empirical research establishes only moderate short- and
long-term sales effects from DTCA (e.g., Berndt et al.
1995; Kremer et al. 2008; Narayanan, Desiraju, and Chinta-
gunta 2009; Osinga, Leeflang, and Wieringa 2010; Wittink
2002). According to Kremer and colleagues (2008), DTCA
elasticities vary across therapeutic classes, with an average
of .073. Other pharmaceutical research establishes that
DTCA has limited to no effect on the prescribing behavior
of physicians (Law, Majumdar, and Soumerai 2008). Iizuka
and Jin (2005) and Wosinska (2005) find that DTCA does
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not affect drug brand choice. Amaldoss and He (2009) and
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2009) summarize other salient
empirical findings on DTCA. Medical researchers also find
insignificant effects on patient requests for prescription
medication (Parnes et al. 2009). In contrast, there are many
empirical studies in which significant effects of DTP have
been found. In their meta-analysis, Kremer and colleagues
(2008) find average elasticities of detailing efforts of .326
and of DTP advertising of .123 over all therapeutic classes
that have been studied thus far.
A plausible explanation for the moderate DTCA effect
on sales is a prisoner’s-dilemma situation; that is, firms’
DTCA efforts cancel each other out, and if a firm were to
cease its DTCA activities, it would lose significant sales.1
However, two empirical realities run counter to this hypothe-
sis. First, manufacturers with drugs in the same category
often do not allocate their DTCA budgets over time in the
same way. Therefore, although DTCA effects may poten-
tially be offset by competitive DTCA in the next period, a
sales model would show significant own and cross-effects.
Second, drugs are generally protected by patents. As a con-
sequence, a pure competitor frequently does not exist, and
in some categories, a drug may even have no competition at
all. Wittink (2002) and Osinga, Leeflang, and Wieringa
(2010) study a large number of categories with differing
levels of competition and conclude that, in general, DTCA
has only a modest sales impact. If DTCA activities are suc-
cessful but canceled out by competition, categories with lit-
tle or no competition would show significant sales effects.
As far as we are aware, no such evidence has been obtained,
leaving unresolved the question of why firms invest in con-
sumer advertising with limited sales response.
In summary, do these various findings from different
research fields mean that DTCA is not effective and that the
pharmaceutical marketing budget is not optimally allocated?
We take a broader view of DTCA and consider the effects
of DTCA on shareholder value to answer that question.
Research Framework: Marketing
Expenditures and Shareholder
Value
Shareholder value depends on stock returns and risk. Stock
returns are the percentage change in a firm’s stock price; we
define risk according to two components: systematic and
idiosyncratic risk (Bansal and Clelland 2004; Campbell et
al. 2001). Systematic risk entails the economywide sources
that affect the overall stock market (e.g., interest rate shifts,
exchange rates, macroeconomic developments) that cannot
be diversified away through a balanced portfolio. Thus,
investors can use the sensitivity of an individual stock’s
return to systematic (market) risk to determine the stock
price. Idiosyncratic risk is the uncertainty about the price of
a specific stock—that is, volatility not associated with that
of other stocks. This type of risk can be eliminated through
effective portfolios, and it does not influence investor valu-
ation of the stock (Brealy, Myers, and Marcus 2001).
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for indicating this possibility.
The efficient market hypothesis implies that stock prices
reflect all known information about the firm’s future earn-
ings prospects (Fama 1970). For example, investors may
expect the firm to maintain its usual level of advertising and
price promotions. Developments (in the form of unexpected
changes) that positively affect future cash flows result in
increases in stock price, while those that negatively affect
cash flows result in decreases. Fehle, Tsyplakov, and
Zdorovtsov (2005), Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005), and
Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) show that advertising
increases the firm’s salience for individual investors, who
typically prefer holding stocks that are well known or famil-
iar to them, thus increasing demand for the firm’s stock.
Accordingly, both unexpected changes in advertising and
the total amount of advertising can affect shareholder value.
Several studies assess the effects of marketing actions,
including advertising and promotions, on shareholder value.
First, a stream of research establishes a relationship
between shareholder value and intermediate marketing asset
metrics, such as customer equity (Rust, Lemon, and Zeit-
haml 2004) and brand equity (Madden, Fehle, and Fournier
2006).
A second stream of research measures the direct effects
of marketing actions on stock price metrics, which repre-
sent the focus of our study. Table 1 summarizes some repre-
sentative studies of the effect of marketing actions on share-
holder value. For example, previous investigations have
considered the effects of new products and sales promotions
(Pauwels et al. 2004) and the influence of advertising and
research and development (R&D) on the stock returns of
firms in the personal computer manufacturing industry
(Joshi and Hanssens 2010). McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim
(2007) and Fornell and colleagues (2006) address the omis-
sion of risk as an outcome variable in marketing literature
by focusing solely on systematic risk. In addition to study-
ing the impact of advertising and, for example, detailing on
the levels of returns, we study their effect on systematic and
idiosyncratic risk components. Our conceptual framework
in Figure 1 illustrates how our study contributes to existing
literature in this research stream.
Marketing Expenditures and Levels of Stock
Returns
Advertising can increase shareholder value by increasing
revenues. The outcomes of several studies suggest that
advertising has a direct effect on firm performance metrics,
including sales (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999) and profits
(Erickson and Jacobson 1992). Thus, unanticipated changes
in the level of advertising affect cash flow expectations. In
addition, studies confirm that advertising expenditures create
an intangible asset (Barth et al. 1998; Rao, Agarwal, and
Dahlhoff 2004). From an investor’s perspective, advertising
spending has a positive and long-term impact on a firm’s
market capitalization (Joshi and Hanssens 2010) that per-
sists beyond the indirect effect of advertising through reve-
nues and profits on market capitalization. Furthermore,
advertising increases demand for a firm’s stock because it
enhances the firm’s salience for individual investors (Barber
and Odean 2008; Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov 2005;
Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; Grullon, Kanatas, and
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Weston 2004; Lou 2009). Using data from many firms,
Chemmanur and Yan (2009) find that stock returns increase
in a year of high advertising expenditures but may decline
in a subsequent year as a result of advertising wear-out.
This effect is likely to be even stronger in the case of phar-
maceutical firms, given that advertising expenditures grew
rapidly after the regulation relaxation, enhancing the visibil-
ity of and attention for pharmaceutical firms. The effect on
demand for the firms’ stocks likely disappeared in the long
run as a result of advertising wear-out and saturated
demand; in other words, individual investors will not keep
on buying additional units of stock. In summary, we expect
that unanticipated increases in DTCA raise stock returns in
the pharmaceutical industry. In addition, we expect that this
effect is strongest directly following the regulation relaxation.
Thus, we posit the following:
H1: DTCA increases stock returns.
H2: The effect of DTCA on stock returns is strongest directly
after the regulation relaxation.
Unexpected changes in DTP expenditures may alter
cash flow expectations. However, the firm’s stock price will
only be affected when investors observe these unexpected
changes. As DTP efforts are directed toward prescribers,
investors only observe DTP expenditures through press
releases or quarterly or annual reports or by buying these
data from a company such as IMS. Inspection of quarterly
reports shows that detailed DTP expenditures are typically
not provided. Experts in the field and IMS contacts indicate
that large investors indeed buy data; however, this mostly
involves financial data about companies’ or products’ mar-
ket positions. Therefore, we conclude that, in general,
investors do not observe DTP expenditures on a weekly or
monthly basis. Given the low visibility of changes in DTP
spending, we hypothesize the following:
H3: DTP marketing has no effect on stock returns.
Marketing Expenditures and Systematic Risk
Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) indicate that the dif-
ferentiation of a brand through advertising may lead to
monopolistic power, which can be leveraged to extract
superior product-market performance, perhaps leading to
more stable (i.e., less dependent on market performance)
earnings in the future. Furthermore, advertising enhances
market penetration, makes it easier to launch product exten-
sions, and increases customer loyalty. Through these
mechanisms, advertising reduces cash flow volatility (Fischer,
Shin, and Hanssens 2009) and, thus, systematic risk. Adver-
tising also may help smooth out the variability in highly
seasonal demand patterns, which should lower cash flow
volatility. Research findings indicate that advertising and
R&D indeed lower a firm’s systematic risk (McAlister,
Srinivasan, and Kim 2007).
Advertising also can influence investor portfolio
choices. Individual investors, unlike institutional ones, pre-
fer holding stocks of well-known firms (Frieder and Sub-
rahmanyam 2005). Through advertising, firms can enhance
awareness among investors and inform them about new
products. Thus, firms that engage in higher levels of adver-
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tising may have a relatively large number of individual
stockholders whose buy and sell decisions would be less
coordinated (Xu and Malkiel 2003). This scenario could
reduce systematic risk. Indeed, executives value individual
investors for their stability and long-term investment objec-
tives (Vogelheim et al. 2001).
Overall, we suggest that the collective benefits of adver-
tising insulate a firm’s stock from market downturns and
thus lower its systematic risk (Veliyath and Ferris 1997).
Because stockholders typically do not have detailed DTP
expenditures information, we do not expect any changes in
systematic risk due to changes in DTP. Therefore, we pro-
pose the following:
H4: DTCA lowers systematic risk. 
H5: DTP marketing has no effect on systematic risk.
Marketing Expenditures and Idiosyncratic Risk
Although DTCA may have a favorable effect on two com-
ponents of firm value—returns and systematic risk—it does
not necessarily favor all components. Specifically, critics
argue that DTCA provides “incomplete and biased informa-
tion, leads to inappropriate prescribing, increases costs as a
result of the added costs of advertising, and consumes time
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in the physician–patient encounter” (Parnes et al. 2009, p.
2). The effects of DTCA might be negative because the
advertisements are legally required to mention the negative
side effects of the advertised drug (Wosinska 2005). As a
relatively new phenomenon in the context of pharmaceuti-
cals, with potentially mixed effects, it may be difficult for
investors to judge the sales effects of DTCA. Furthermore,
the lack of substantial sales response effects of DTCA may
cause an increase in firm-specific risk. Because DTCA
serves as an informational mechanism for individual investors
about such things as new product launches, it should
enhance, or reactivate, investor awareness. This may cause
individual investors to pay more attention to firm-specific
news, such as clinical concerns, which would result in a
stronger investor response to company news about stock
returns—that is, an increase in idiosyncratic risk. This
effect is different from the one described for systematic
risk, for which we hypothesize that the firm’s increased
salience among individual investors enhances their propen-
sity to buy the firm’s stock, leading to a larger degree of
individual investor ownership, which in turn should reduce
systematic risk. In the case of idiosyncratic risk, we argue
that existing stockholders’ awareness may be enhanced, or
reactivated, thereby leading to a greater impact of company-
Advertising
(e.g., DTCA)
Promotions
(e.g., DTP)
Abnormal Returns
Business results, 
marketing signals
Systematic Market Risk
The part of risk explained by
changes in average market
portfolio returns (b)
Idiosyncratic Risk
The part of risk that cannot be
explained by changes in average
market portfolio returns
Joshi and Hanssens (2010);
Advertising Impact
Pauwels et al. (2004);
Promotions Impact
Srinivasan et al. (2009);
Advertising and Promotions Impact
Firm Marketing Actions
Firm Financial Performance
FIGURE 1
Research Framework
McAlister et al. (2007);
Advertising Impact
Fornell et al. (2006); Customer Satisfaction Impact
This Study; Advertising and Promotions Impact on Returns, Systematic Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk
specific news. Moreover, DTCA may increase risk because
the advertisements are required to mention the side effects.
It must be noted that the two hypothesized effects do not
contradict each other: The stock price may move up or
down with the market and, on top of that, display larger
fluctuations because of the firm-specific news. We do not
expect changes in idiosyncratic risk as a result of changes to
DTP, because investors do not directly observe DTP expen-
ditures and DTP marketing has long been in use as a proven
communication vehicle in the pharmaceutical industry.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H6: DTCA increases idiosyncratic risk.
H7: DTP marketing has no effect on idiosyncratic risk.
Research Design and Methodology
Model Specification
To assess the impact of marketing expenditures on returns
and systematic and idiosyncratic risk, we develop a
dynamic model that we estimate using Kalman filtering. As
a starting point, we use Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model,
which Luo and Bhattacharya (2009), Sood and Tellis
(2009), and Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007),
among others, have applied to a marketing context. The
model extends the well-known capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) and explains a firm’s return premium, which is the
difference between the firm’s return R and the return on a
risk-free investment Rrf, according to (1) the excess market
return, Rm − Rrf, where Rm is the market return; (2) the dif-
ference between the return on a portfolio of small firms and
that of large firms (small minus big, SMB); (3) the differ-
ence between the return on portfolios of high versus low
book-to-market equity firms (high minus low, HML); and
(4) a momentum factor, defined as the difference in the
return between portfolios of firms with high versus low
prior returns (up minus down, UMD). Carhart (1997) shows
that this four-factor model captures known anomalies in
excess returns. For firm i at time t, the four-factor model is
as follows:
(1) (Rit – Rrft) = b0i + b1i(Rmt – Rrft) + b2iSMBt
+ b3iHMLt + b4iUMDt + eit,
where eit ~ N(0, s2ei). The parameter b0i captures structural
excess returns that should not be present and should be
equal to 0 in the case of an efficient market. Short-term
excess returns appear in eit. The parameter b1i measures the
firm’s systematic risk, and s2ei is a measure of idiosyncratic
risk (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009). The parameter b2i indi-
cates the extent to which the firm’s stock returns move with
those from a portfolio of small stocks (higher value for b2i)
or those from large stocks (lower value for b2i); similarly,b3i takes on a higher value when the stock returns show
more correspondence with those from high book-to-market
equity firms and lower values when they are closer to the
returns from low book-to-market equity firms. Finally, b4i
indicates the extent to which the stock returns correspond to
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those from firms that performed well in the previous period;
therefore, when a firm’s stock has momentum, we expect a
positive, significant estimate for b4i.
Marketing expenditures and levels of stock returns. To
test our hypotheses regarding the effects of DTCA and DTP
expenditures on stock returns, we extend Equation 1 to
include measures of DTCA and DTP. In addition, we
include revenues (REV), profits (PROFIT), and R&D
expenditures (RD). These additions help distinguish
between direct effects from marketing expenditures and
indirect effects that run through these other variables (Joshi
and Hanssens 2010; Srinivasan et al. 2009). We do not
include competitive variables, because not only pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers compete for investors’ dollars. Follow-
ing Aaker and Jacobson (1994, 2001) and Srinivasan and
colleagues (2009), we assume that shareholders only
respond when new and unexpected information becomes
available (Fama 1970). We do not observe these data but
define unanticipated changes (U) through first-order autore-
gressive models as described in detail in the “Data” section.
However, in the case of DTCA, we make an exception:
Because shareholders observe DTCA not only in the firms’
profit-and-loss statements but also as consumers, we
include this variable in both unexpected shocks and levels,
operationalized through a stock variable DTCAS, to capture
another important difference in the possible effects of
DTCA and DTP. Specifically, the timing of information
release to investors is continuous and repetitive in the case
of DTCA but discrete for DTP. To test H2, we include a
dummy variable multiplied by DTCA levels because these,
and not the unexpected changes, are likely to drive the
firm’s salience for individual investors.
Marketing expenditures and systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk. To test our hypotheses regarding the relationship
between DTCA and DTP and the two types of risk, we
specify how dynamic risk measures evolve over time and
how the marketing expenditures influence these move-
ments. Ghysels (1998) argues that systematic risk changes
slowly over time and that an overly volatile measure might
lead to worse predictions than a model with a static effect.
Building on well-accepted financial models, Braun, Nelson,
and Sunier (1995) model systematic and idiosyncratic risk
with first-order autoregressive processes and obtain carry-
over parameters that tend to be close to unity, indicating
that the risk components follow a smooth pattern over time.
Similarly, using a nonparametric approach, Cai (2007)
demonstrates that the pattern of systematic risk over time is
smooth. A further indication of the general lack of volatility
in the risk parameters is the frequency with which the
CAPM and four-factor model are estimated over long data
windows. For example, Carhart (1997) uses 30 years of data
with differing portfolios, and McAlister, Srinivasan, and
Kim (2007) use 5-year windows of firm-level data to esti-
mate CAPMs.
Following Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1995), we base
our specifications for systematic and idiosyncratic risk on
autoregressive processes. We incorporate unexpected
changes in DTCA and DTP, as well as revenues, profits,
and R&D expenditures, as exogenous variables in these
specifications. We also include the DTCA stock variable, as
we did for the levels of returns. In the case of idiosyncratic
risk, we do not add an error term to the equation, which
would make the estimation rather more difficult.2 Instead,
our specification of idiosyncratic risk is a deterministic ver-
sion of the stochastic volatility model, which has a strong
theoretical foundation in finance literature (Durbin and
Koopman 2001). This model consists of a series with mean
0, the exponent of which we multiply by a scaling parame-
ter k.
To fine-tune the optimal size of the carryover parame-
ters and the order of the autoregressive processes, we test
three alternative specifications: (1) a first-order autoregres-
sive process, (2) a second-order autoregressive process, and
(3) a random walk specification, with carryover parameters
equal to 1. The estimation of our full model using the first-
and second-order autoregressive models indicates that the
carryover parameters only just lie within the unit circle,
similar to the results Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1995) pro-
vide. Therefore, it is no surprise that the more parsimonious
random walk specification fits even better, as indicated by
the Bayesian and corrected Akaike information criteria
(BIC and AICc, respectively). Therefore, we proceed with
the parsimonious random walk specification.
Pooling. Because of the many parameters in our model
and the modest number of observations available per firm,
we cannot estimate the model at the individual firm level.
Instead, we partially pool monthly data from different firms
in our sample, similar to Joshi and Hanssens (2010), who
pool quarterly data in their analysis. To accommodate firm-
level heterogeneity, we include firm-specific intercepts, sys-
tematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk measures. Because we
study firms in the same industry, it is likely that there are
factors that affect all firms in the same direction, though not
necessarily to the same extent.3 Examples of such factors
include new legislation, epidemics, and new technology
available to all firms. Therefore, we specify a full covari-
ance matrix, allowing the errors of the different firms to be
contemporaneously correlated.4
Our final model consists of three parts (Equations
2a–2d). For firm i = 1, ..., 8, at time t, we have the following.
Levels of Returns
(2a) (Rit – Rrf,t) = b0i + b1it(Rmt – Rrf,t) + b2SMBt + b3HMLt
+ b4UMDt + g1DTCASit(1 – Dt) + g2DTCASitDt
+ g3(U)DTCAit + g4(U)DTPit + g5(U)REVit
+ g6(U)PROFITit + g7(U)RDit + eit,
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where eit ~ N(0, s2eit) such that the correlation between eit
and ejt, j π i is equal to rij and where Dt is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 in the periods directly following the
regulation relaxation and 0 otherwise.
Systematic Risk
(2b) b1it = b1it – 1 + j1DTCASit + j2(U)DTCAit + j3(U)DTPit
+ j4(U)REVit + j5(U)PROFITit + j6(U)RDit + hit,
where hit ~ N(0, s2h).
Idiosyncratic Risk
(2c) s2eit = kiexp(hit),
where ki is the firm-specific scaling parameter, and 
(2d) hit = hit – 1 + l1DTCASit + l2(U)DTCAit + l3(U)DTPit
+ l4(U)REVit + l5(U)PROFITit + l6(U)RDit.
In Equations 2a–2d, the b parameters correspond to the four-
factor model from Equation 1, and we note that b1it and s2eit
include subscript t to allow for time-varying systematic and
idiosyncratic risk. The g parameters indicate the effects of
the marketing, R&D, and firm performance variables on
returns. The effects of these variables on systematic and
idiosyncratic risk are given by the j and l parameter sets,
respectively. Firm-specific effects are accommodated through
the firm-specific intercepts b0i, the firm-specific error vari-
ance scaling parameters ki, and the initial values of the sys-
tematic risk series b1i0.
Model Estimation
We estimate our model with Kalman filtering, as has been
applied previously in marketing contexts by, among others,
Naik, Mantrala, and Sawyer (1998), Naik and Raman
(2003), and Osinga, Leeflang, and Wieringa (2010) in their
efforts to model advertising and promotion effects over time
and by Xie and colleagues (1997) and Van Everdingen,
Aghina, and Fok (2005) to model diffusion processes using
an augmented version with continuous states. For example,
Van Heerde, Mela, and Manchanda’s (2004) and Ataman,
Mela, and Van Heerde’s (2008) applications of the Bayesian
dynamic linear model are related closely to the Kalman fil-
ter methodology as well. Our model is linear and Gaussian,
so we apply classical Kalman filtering, which is substan-
tially faster than the Bayesian approach.
To apply this method, we first write our model in state-
space form and specify it in terms of observation and transi-
tion equations. The transition equations describe how the
time-varying parameters evolve over time and link to the
endogenous variable using the observation equations
(Durbin and Koopman 2001; Naik, Mantrala, and Sawyer
1998). We can rewrite Equations 2a–2d in state-space form
using the observation equations
2Because our results indicate a small variance for the error term
related to systematic risk, we do not regard this omission as a
major limitation of our model.
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.
4Allowing for correlated errors in the equation for systematic
risk, hit, does not improve model fit.
and the transition equations
where eit ~ N(0, s2eit), the correlation between eit and ejt is
equal to rij, and hit ~ N(0, s2h).
Next, we apply standard Kalman filter routines and use
a numerical optimization method for the log-likelihood
function to obtain the optimal parameter vector q (for tech-
nical details, see Durbin and Koopman 2001). The parame-
ter vector q contains b0i; the initial values for b1it; the otherb parameters; all g, j, and k parameters; the error variance
s2h; and correlation coefficients r. When possible, we use
regression coefficients as starting values for the parameters
and apply different starting values for the other parameters,
where all sets of starting values converge to the same solu-
tion. We obtain the parameter standard errors from the
information matrix evaluated at estimated values (Naik and
Raman 2003). We use the smoothed coefficients for b1it,
which contain information from all periods. Finally, we per-
form standard diagnostic checks on the standardized one-
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step forecast errors. We test the errors for nonnormality, ser-
ial correlation, and nonconstant variance over time (here we
test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity).
Data
Our monthly data for 1993–2000 are for the eight largest
U.S.-based drug manufacturers: Abbott, Bristol-Myers
Squibb (BMS), Johnson & Johnson (J&J), Eli Lilly (Lilly),
Merck, Pfizer, Schering-Plough (Schering), and Wyeth.5
For these firms, we have data about all prescription drugs
with 2000 annual sales of $25 million or more. We did not
include GlaxoSmithKline because it likely experienced
important merger and acquisition influences, and we
excluded Procter & Gamble because of the firm’s diverse
nature. Table 2 lists the definition of the variables and the
data sources used.
We obtained data from various sources, such as Data-
stream, COMPUSTAT, Kenneth French’s Web site, Scott-
Levin, and PERQ/HCI.6With regard to stock returns, we used
the total return index, which assumes that dividends are rein-
vested to buy additional units of equity. We transformed the
quarterly profit data to monthly data using revenue-based
weights; to assign the quarterly R&D expenditures to months,
we evenly distributed the expenditures over the quarter.
To measure unanticipated changes in DTCA, we fol-
lowed Aaker and Jacobson (1994) and Srinivasan and col-
leagues (2009) and took the residuals of a first-order autore-
gressive model. Because we could observe seasonality, we
added monthly dummies to account for seasonality effects.
However, unlike the two previously mentioned studies, we
did not pool the models for the unanticipated changes over
the different firms. Intuitively, this makes sense because it
might be assumed that investors have firm-specific expecta-
tions. This assertion is confirmed in our subsequent empiri-
cal results. With regard to H2, we tested whether the effect
of DTCA on stock returns is strongest in the first six
months after the regulation relaxation. Chemmanur and Yan
(2009) consider a one-year period for a large number of
firms. However, these firms likely did not increase their
advertising budgets as abruptly and quickly as pharmaceuti-
cal firms. In addition, Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov
(2005) show that airing television commercials during
Super Bowl broadcasts may increase a firm’s stock price,
confirming that individual investors have attention-driven
buying strategies (Barber and Odean 2008). Therefore,
compared with Chemmanur and Yan (2009), we assumed a
more rapid effect on the visibility of drug manufacturers to
individual investors.
For the advertising stock, DTCAS, we used Nerlove and
Arrow’s (1962) specification, with a square root to capture
diminishing returns and a carryover parameter of .75 from
Narayanan, Desiraju, and Chintagunta (2004). That is,
DTCASit = .75DTCASit – 1 + ÷DTCAit. For the purposes of
scaling, we divided the stock variables by 1000.
5This is based on total revenues in December 2000 across all
products in our database.
6For Kenneth French’s Web site, see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.
edu/pages/faculty/ken.french.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the key variables in the
study, namely, stock returns and DTCA and DTP expendi-
tures. For DTCA, we only took observations after the regu-
lation relaxation into account to avoid the influence of zero
values. Average monthly returns are largest for Lilly, Pfizer,
and Schering, though differences from other firms are not
significant. Lilly spends the least amount on DTCA and
DTP; in contrast, Pfizer and Schering are the largest
investors in DTCA, and Pfizer also spends the most on DTP.
Table 4 provides the correlations and variance inflation
factors between our model variables. The variance inflation
factors are no larger than 2.7, suggesting that multi-
collinearity among the variables is not a concern.
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Main Results
We simultaneously estimated the equations in our dynamic
four-factor model (Equations 2a–2d) using data from eight
pharmaceutical firms.7 On average, across firms, our model
explains approximately 28.6% of the temporal variation in
7We verified whether the different DTCAS, (U)DTCA, and
(U)DTP effects could be disentangled by examining the parameter
correlation matrix and found that all cross-correlations are suffi-
ciently low. We also estimated a system of equations with each
firm’s DTCA expenditures as endogenous variable and obtained
similar substantive results. When we tested the standardized one-
step forecast errors for normality, serial correlation, and autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity, we found that they met all
standard assumptions. The auxiliary residuals (Durbin and Koop-
man 2001) indicated two clear outliers, which we controlled for
using dummy variables.
TABLE 2
Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
R Company return, derived from the total return index Datastream
Rm Market return Kenneth French’s Web site
Rrf Return on a risk-free investment Kenneth French’s Web site
SMB Small-minus-big factor: return difference between portfolios Kenneth French’s Web site
of small and large firms
HML High-minus-low factor: return difference between portfolios Kenneth French’s Web site
of high and low book-to-market equity firms
UMD Up-minus-down factor: return difference between portfolios Kenneth French’s Web site
of firms with high and low prior returns
DTCA Direct-to-consumer advertising Scott-Levin
DTCAS Direct-to-consumer advertising stock Scott-Levin
(U)DTCA (Unexpected changes in) DTCA Scott-Levin
(U)DTP (Unexpected changes in) DTP Scott-Levin, journal advertising
from PERQ/HCI
(U)REV (Unexpected changes in) revenues Scott-Levin
(U)PROFIT (Unexpected changes in) profits (quarterly profit figures are COMPUSTAT
distributed over months using revenue-based weights)
(U)RD (Unexpected changes in) R&D expenditures(quarterly COMPUSTAT
R&D expenditures are evenly distributed over the 
quarters’ months)
Notes: We omit the firm and time indexes.
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Key Variables
Stock Returns DTCA DTP
Variable M SD M SD M SD
Abbott 1.418 5.581 2.583 2.853 15.797 3.442
BMS 1.696 6.098 6.110 5.121 21.830 4.440
J&J 1.618 6.989 3.548 1.662 17.781 2.981
Lilly 2.294 9.374 1.790 1.732 9.947 2.512
Merck 1.757 8.108 12.927 8.047 23.915 9.693
Pfizer 2.285 7.625 14.729 7.687 58.355 17.319
Schering 2.284 8.366 13.616 10.448 16.507 6.222
Wyeth 1.618 7.966 2.877 1.327 11.175 3.627
Notes: DTCA and DTP expenditures are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Statistics for stock returns and DTP expenditures are based on
94 observations per firm (two observations per firm are lost because of the dynamics in our model). In the case of DTCA, we focus on
all time periods from August 1997, resulting in 41 observations per firm (one observation is lost because of model dynamics).
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firms’ stock returns. Table 5 presents the results for Equa-
tion 2a, though without the systematic risk coefficients,
which we discuss in detail together with the results for
Equation 26.
From Table 5, we conclude that the constants are posi-
tive for all firms, and four of the eight constants are signifi-
cant at least at p < .05. Therefore, these four firms seem to
outperform the market systematically in our data window.
With regard to SMB and HML, we find significant and
negative signs (p < .01 and p < .05, respectively). From the
SMB coefficient, we can infer that the (typically large)
pharmaceutical firms’ stock returns show more correspon-
dence with those of large firms. The negative sign of the
HML variable indicates that the stock returns move together
with low book-to-market equity firms. The momentum fac-
tor (UMD) is insignificant and in line with Fama and
French’s (1996) question about whether the momentum
effect is real and their call for more empirical verification of
momentum (see also Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). We
cannot directly confirm H1, because we do not find a sig-
nificant effect of DTCA on stock returns for unexpected
changes or the stock variable. In the months directly follow-
ing the regulation relaxation, DTCA had a significantly
stronger positive effect, in support of H2. Not only is the
effect in this time window stronger than in other months,
but DTCA also significantly increases stock returns (p <
.05), providing partial support for H1. These results are in
line with Chemmanur and Yan (2009), who find that adver-
tising can help attract investors’ attention but that the effect
may diminish in the long run because of advertising wear-
out or possibly saturation. The significant (p < .05) and
positive value for the coefficient of unexpected changes in
DTP on stock returns conflicts with H3. This implies that
investors do observe and value higher-than-expected DTP
expenditures. Therefore, it is plausible that large investors
rely more on data from companies such as IMS to track
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DTP expenditures than we concluded from our discussions
with these data providers.
We provide the time-varying systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk measures in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. For all
firms, systematic risk is far lower at the end of the second
regime than it is in the first regime. In most cases, system-
atic risk even falls below 0. This finding suggests that fluc-
tuations in the returns of these firms move contrary to fluc-
tuations in market returns. Figure 3 displays an opposite
pattern: Idiosyncratic risk increases over time for all firms.
The fall and rise of systematic and idiosyncratic risk,
respectively, are most severe after DTCA regulations were
relaxed.
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates and standard
deviations for Equation 2b. The initial values of systematic
risk are lower than 1 for six of the eight firms. Systematic
risk lower than 1 indicates that the stock’s return goes up
TABLE 5
Estimation Results for Returns
Parameter Value SD
Constant Abbott 1.015** .516
Constant BMS .908* .534
Constant J&J 1.131* .591
Constant Lilly 2.058** .889
Constant Merck 1.256* .702
Constant Pfizer 1.754*** .675
Constant Schering 1.492** .718
Constant Wyeth .973 .654
SMB –.673*** .148
HML –.429** .195
UMD –.031 .116
DTCAS ¥ (1 – D) –.049 .064
DTCAS ¥ D .323** .145
(U)DTCA .024 .072
(U)DTP .139** .065
(U)REV .033* .019
(U)PROFIT .001 .003
(U)RD –.003 .021
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Systematic Risk over Time
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Idiosyncratic Risk over Time
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(down) to a lesser extent than the market when it goes up
(down). Furthermore, we conclude that the DTCA stock
and the unexpected changes in DTCA have a significant (p <
.01 and p < .05, respectively) and negative effect on system-
atic risk, in support of H4. We also find support for H5
because there are no changes in systematic risk due to unan-
ticipated changes in DTP expenditures.
The parameter estimates for Equation 2c–2d in Table 7
reveal a highly significant (p < .01) and positive estimate
for the stock of DTCA, in support of the hypothesized
effect of DTCA on idiosyncratic risk (H6). In contrast with
H7, we find that unexpected changes in DTP expenditures
tend to have a significant and positive effect on idiosyn-
cratic risk (p < .1), indicating that unanticipated rises in
DTP expenditures lead to more uncertainty about the firm’s
stock price. We further note that the values of the scaling
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parameters for idiosyncratic risk greatly vary across firms,
with a particularly high value for Lilly.
Our empirical findings support our DTCA-related
hypotheses. However, the hypotheses regarding the effects
of DTP expenditures on returns and idiosyncratic risk—H3
and H7, respectively—receive no support, though it must be
noted that the effect on idiosyncratic risk is significant only
at the 10% level. The results indicate that investors do
observe physician-directed efforts and that unanticipated
shocks in these efforts simultaneously increase stock
returns and raise idiosyncratic risk. We summarize and
compare our outcomes with those of McAlister, Srinivasan,
and Kim (2007) and Joshi and Hanssens (2010) in Table 8;
we confirm McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim’s (2007) find-
ings about the effects of DTCA on systematic risk, and we
TABLE 6
Estimation Results for Systematic Risk
Parameter
Value SD
Initial systematic risk Abbott .419** .156
Initial systematic risk BMS .698** .207
Initial systematic risk J&J .897** .208
Initial systematic risk Lilly .394 .270
Initial systematic risk Merck .573 .489
Initial systematic risk Pfizer .826** .319
Initial systematic risk Schering 1.025** .283
Initial systematic risk Wyeth 1.013** .293
DTCAS –.003** .001
(U)DTCA –.011* .006
(U)DTP .003 .008
(U)REV –.001 .002
(U)PROFIT .000 .000
(U)RD –.001 .002
Variance error term .001 .001–.001
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
Notes: For the error variance, we give 95% confidence intervals
instead of a standard deviation.
TABLE 7
Estimation Results for Idiosyncratic Risk
Parameter
Value SD
DTCAS .003** .000
(U)DTCA –.001 .006
(U)DTP .016* .008
(U)REV –.003 .002
(U)PROFIT .000 .000
(U)RD .001 .001
Scaling parameter Abbott 20.304 14.947 27.580
Scaling parameter BMS 15.602 10.757 22.628
Scaling parameter J&J 20.885 14.727 29.619
Scaling parameter Lilly 77.264 52.398 113.929
Scaling parameter Merck 35.558 18.483 68.408
Scaling parameter Pfizer 29.621 18.894 46.436
Scaling parameter Schering 21.550 14.785 31.411
Scaling parameter Wyeth 18.081 11.178 29.248
*p < .1.
**p < .01.
Notes: For the scaling parameters, we give 95% confidence inter-
vals instead of a standard deviation. We transform these
parameters in the estimation process to ensure that they
meet the requirement of being strictly positive. The transfor-
mation also explains the asymmetric confidence intervals.
TABLE 8
Overview of Empirical Support for Conceptual Framework
Supported?
McAlister, Srinivasan, Joshi and
Hypotheses and Kim (2007) Hanssens (2010) This Study
Stock Returns
H1: DTCA increases stock returns. — Yes Partial
H2: The effect of DTCA on stock returns is — — Yes
strongest directly after the regulation 
relaxation.
H3: DTP has no effect on stock returns. — — No
Systematic Risk
H4: DTCA lowers systematic risk. Yes — Yes
H5: DTP has no effect on systematic risk. — — Yes
Idiosyncratic Risk
H6: DTCA increases idiosyncratic risk. — — Yes
H7: DTP has no effect on idiosyncratic risk. — — No
Notes: “—”denotes that the effect is not investigated.
find partial support for the effect on returns, as Joshi and
Hanssens’s (2010) study indicates.
Robustness Checks and Relevance of the Effects
In our empirical analysis, we performed several robustness
checks. First, we tested whether a higher-order model to
determine the unanticipated changes leads to a better fit of
the full model (Equations 2a–2d). Both the BIC and AICc
indicate that the model fit does not improve when we
increase the number of lags. From a substantive point of
view, the results are robust, apart from H7, which we cannot
reject; in other words, the effect of (U)DTP on idiosyncratic
risk is no longer significant when we assume a lag length
exceeding three. Second, we also tested whether our results
are robust to including year dummies in the unanticipated
changes equations (Aaker and Jacobson 1994). Again, we
found that all our conclusions hold except for the effect of
(U)DTP on idiosyncratic risk, which is not significant. We
expected a stronger effect in the months following the regu-
lation relaxation. To test the sensitivity of our results to the
assumption of a time window of six months, we estimated
our model assuming windows of three to nine months. We
obtained similar substantive results in all cases: The find-
ings in Table 8 do not change. Finally, to test the sensitivity
to the assumption of a DTCA stock carryover parameter of
.75, we estimated the model assuming carryover parameter
values in the range of .6 and .9, with a step size of .05 and
again found the results, including those reported in Table 8,
to be robust.
To explicate the relevance of our results, we first
assessed the changes in the percentage of variance
explained by estimating our model without the DTCA
variables and then without the DTP variables. The model
without the DTCA variables has an R-square of .236, or a
decline of 17.4% in explanatory power compared with the
full model (Equations 2a–2d). Therefore, we conclude that
DTCA plays an important role in explaining firm stock
returns. However, the explanatory power of the model with-
out the DTP components declines only marginally; that is,
with an R-square of .280, the percentage of variance
explained decreases by only 2.3%. Although it is signifi-
cant, DTP expenditures are far less important for explaining
stock returns than DTCA. In addition, we assessed the con-
tribution of each of the hypothesized effects to the model
fit.8 Comparison of these fit statistics with those for the full
model indicate that the effects of DTCA on systematic and
idiosyncratic risk, as related to H4 and H6, respectively,
contribute most to the model fit.
Managerial Implications
Our study offers several managerial implications. Managers
who evaluate marketing expenditures should consider the
effects of marketing on all stakeholders, not just consumers,
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which should significantly influence the size and allocation
of the marketing budget. We illustrate this through a sce-
nario analysis that indicates the consequences of a change
in DTCA expenditures on stock returns and risk. Existing
research indicates that at least some expenditures on DTCA
may be better allocated elsewhere (e.g., Law, Majumdar,
and Soumerai 2008).
We calculated the stock return and risk impact when
there was a 20% decrease in DTCA expenditures for all
periods from August 1997, the month of the regulation
relaxation, to December 2000. This decrease affected both
the advertising stock variable and the unexpected changes
in advertising variable. We retained all other variables at
their original levels and took both significant and insignifi-
cant variables into account. We assessed the short- and
long-term financial consequences of a decrease in DTCA.
These are defined, respectively, as the first six months fol-
lowing the relaxation of the regulation and all periods from
August 1997 to December 2000. We determined the per-
centage change in cumulative returns over the time window
considered, and for systematic and idiosyncratic risk, we
evaluated the change and percentage change, respectively,
in the final period of the considered time window compared
with the original situation.
Our results show that, on average, the decrease in
DTCA expenditures decreases cumulative returns by 5.3%
and increases systematic risk by only .01 in the short run.
Across firms, idiosyncratic risk is .3% lower than in the
original situation. However, this does not affect investors
who hold a well-diversified portfolio. In the long run, the
negative effect on cumulative returns dissipates because of
the insignificant but negative effect of DTCA on returns
(DTCAS parameter = –.049). However, the effect on sys-
tematic risk is more severe, with an average increase of .14.
Idiosyncratic risk drops 10.5%. Our results indicate that a
reduction in DTCA expenditures predominantly affects
returns in the short run, whereas the effect on systematic
risk is more pronounced in the long run.
A possible explanation for this finding is that in the
short run, DTCA enhances the firms’ prospects as well as
the salience for individual investors. In turn, this increases
the demand for the firms’ stocks. In the long run, more sta-
ble cash flows and a more diversified investor base (i.e., less
coordinated buying and selling decisions) lead to lower sys-
tematic risk. A consideration of sales effects alone likely
would lead to a decrease in DTCA expenditures (see Kre-
mer et al. 2008). Given the strong DTCA effects on share-
holder value, this decrease would be detrimental from a
shareholder’s point of view. Thus, DTCA and DTP serve
different goals, and both components should be integral
parts of an overall marketing communication strategy.
Conclusions, Limitations, and
Further Research
We study the effects of DTCA and DTP expenditures for
pharmaceuticals. Relying on Kalman filtering, we demon-
strate that marketing expenditures with limited sales effects
can influence the three components of shareholder value:
stock returns, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk.
8We estimated models leaving out the effects described in the
specific hypothesis and determined BIC and AICc statistics. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. A table
with BIC and AICc values is available on request from the first
author.
We demonstrate that DTCA not only increases stock
returns but also decreases systematic risk. These outcomes
are comparable to Fornell and colleagues’ (2006) findings
regarding the relationships among customer satisfaction,
risk, and return. Moreover, we found that DTCA increases
idiosyncratic risk, though we note that this increase does
not affect investors who maintain a well-diversified portfo-
lio. The increase in idiosyncratic risk likely occurs because
investors perceive DTCA as a risky investment. It is also
plausible that investors become more involved with the com-
pany, which would lead to a stronger response to company-
specific news. Whereas previous research has focused pri-
marily on the levels of returns, we uncover important
relationships among strategic marketing variables, includ-
ing DTCA, DTP, levels of stock return, and the two compo-
nents of risk. Thus, our study highlights the strategic impor-
tance of DTCA, which increases returns and reduces
systematic risk, thus enhancing long-term shareholder
wealth. The impact of advertising on stock performance is
indicative of market inefficiency and enables firms to beat
competition in offering superior shareholder value.9 In turn,
this effect helps shape the perspective of finance managers
who are concerned about the uncertain impact of DTCA,
given its moderate sales impact. A key managerial implica-
tion is that firms should strike a balance in their DTCA
expenditures to optimize the net benefits from a shareholder
perspective.
Our study has several limitations. First, we rely on
aggregate data. More accurate results might be obtained by
surveying investors to determine how marketing activities
(e.g., DTCA, DTP) influence their behavior. Second, we
use autoregressive models to determine unanticipated
changes in the variables. A fruitful research avenue would
be to assess how investors form expectations and how these
expectations can be captured when using aggregate data.
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Third, we do not take into account the rise of Web trading,
which overlaps with our data window. For example,
Schwab’s Web trading service went live in 1996 (Charles
Schwab Corporation 2009). Easy access to the stock market
for individual investors may have reinforced DTCA effects;
that is, a firm’s increased salience for individual investors
due to DTCA better translates into shareholder value
because of easy access to the stock market.
We identify several additional directions for further
research. First, an extension of our findings to other industries
and in both business-to-business and business-to-consumer
contexts would reinforce our conclusions. To the extent that
investors directly observe advertising, our approach is suit-
able in both contexts. Because investors might directly
observe promotional efforts in a business-to-consumer con-
text and their effects might only become clear from the
company’s books in a business-to-business context, it is
important to determine how the stock market effects differ
across contexts. Second, additional research should distin-
guish between the impact of DTCA for firms that introduce
many new products and those that mainly use DTCA to
support existing brands. Third, researchers could attempt to
disentangle the effects of DTCA for ethical drugs with large
versus small market potential, incorporating the company’s
product portfolio composition into their analyses. Fourth,
insights into the relationship between marketing invest-
ments and their ultimate effect on shareholder value might
be improved by including intermediate customer mind-set
metrics, such as brand awareness and brand liking (Srini-
vasan, Vanhuele, and Pauwels 2010), and marketing asset
metrics, such as customer equity and brand equity. Finally,
a challenge for further research would be to develop a struc-
tural model of a firm’s marketing actions and investor
behavior. In summary, our work contributes to ongoing
efforts, of practitioners and academics alike, by underscor-
ing the importance of assessing the contribution of the mar-
keting actions in light of their impact on the firm’s ultimate
goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.
9We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our 
attention.
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